Windows Logs Automation
Offline Artifacts Collection
Unix Collector
Velociraptor Offline Agent
In certain scenarios, it may be necessary to collect artifacts from target machines in an offline mode, ensuring minimal alteration or contamination of the digital environment. Various tools are available for this purpose, designed to extract information discreetly and effectively. These tools enable forensic investigators to gather crucial data without compromising the integrity of the evidence.
Importing an offline collection can be done via the Server.Utils.ImportCollection artifact. This artifact will inspect the zip file from a path specified on the server and import it as a new collection (with a new collection ID) into either a specified client or a new randomly generated client.
Using the KAPE GUI to analyze the artifacts
Instead of the velociraptor GUI, you can use the KAPE GUI to analyze and process all the artifacts.
If you are running it locally, the "Module Source" should be the folder where the artifacts obtained are. 😎
Next, you can use "TimeLine Explorer " to analyze the result.
KAPE Agent Collector
KAPE agent can be used to collect also the data.
The GUI can be used to select what kind of collection we want to do:
For collecting the artifacts on the remote machine, you just need to use the kape.exe collector with the Modules and Targets folder. See below:
To execute it, open a new command line with administrator rights, and paste the command obtained from step 4 on the GUI.
.\kape.exe --tsource C: --tdest C:\temp\kape --tflush --target !SANS_Triage --zip SERVER-DC01 --debug --guiNext, the data will be available on: C:\temp\kap inside a zip file.
Run modules on the target machine
In addition, you can also run the modules on the target machine or locally.
If you are running it locally, the "Module Source" should be the folder where the artifacts obtained are. 😎
Next, you can use "TimeLine Explorer " to analyze the result.
Remote Collections with KAPE
kape.exe --tsource \\target-1\c --target LnkFilesAndJumpLists --tdest c:\kape_out\test or accessing the target machine, mount the kape server folder, and run it remotely without touch with the binary on disk.
net use k: \\kape-server-vm\triage /user:kape-server-vm\analyst
k:\kape\kape.exe --tsource C --target RegistryHives --tdest k:\kape_out\tdest --vss
Building your agent collector
By developing an agent, you can collect also the raw files from the target Windows machine. This can be very useful for post-analysis in a depth way.
Next, see some of the raw artifacts collected.
Example of the content of the "amcache directory":
Full disk image
In order to obtain a complete snapshot of the target machines the following tools can be used:
FTK IMAGER
Disk2vhd
More details on how to use it can be found here:
chntpwn
Also the usage of chntpwn to change Windows local administration passwords before executing an analysis.
Autopsy
TestDisk & PhotoRec
This tool can be used to recover files from damaged devices.
Velociraptor Analysis
After getting the ZIP files with all the artifacts, the file must be imported into the GUI.
Importing an offline collection can be done via the Server.Utils.ImportCollection artifact. This artifact will inspect the zip file from a path specified on the server and import it as a new collection (with new collection id) into either a specified client or a new randomly generated client.
After that, click on "Search" and select the target machine ID you want to analyze.
After that, select the artifacts FLOWID, click on Notebook, and all the data is presented! 👍
In addition, you can also create a new hunting and add the notebook logs into the hunting process. This is just a way how to split the results to perform a better analysis.
Eventx Analysis
chainsaw
git clone https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/chainsaw.git
./chainsaw hunt EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/ -s sigma/ --mapping mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.ymlSearch all .evtx files for the case-insensitive string "mimikatz"
./chainsaw search mimikatz -i evtx_attack_samples/*Search all .evtx files for powershell script block events (Event ID 4014
./chainsaw search -t 'Event.System.EventID: =4104' evtx_attack_samples/Search a specific evtx log for logon events, with a matching regex pattern, output in JSON format
./chainsaw search -e "DC[0-9].insecurebank.local" evtx_attack_samples --jsonHunting
Hunt through all evtx files using Sigma rules for detection logic
./chainsaw hunt evtx_attack_samples/ -s sigma/ --mapping mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.ymlHunt through all evtx files using Sigma rules and Chainsaw rules for detection logic and output in CSV format to the results folder
./chainsaw hunt evtx_attack_samples/ -s sigma/ --mapping mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.yml -r rules/ --csv --output resultsHunt through all evtx files using Sigma rules for detection logic, only search between specific timestamps, and output the results in JSON format
./chainsaw hunt evtx_attack_samples/ -s sigma/ --mapping mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.yml --from "2019-03-17T19:09:39" --to "2019-03-17T19:09:50" --json$ ./chainsaw hunt -r rules/ evtx_attack_samples -s sigma/rules --mapping mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.yml --level critical
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╚═════╝╚═╝ ╚═╝╚═╝ ╚═╝╚═╝╚═╝ ╚═══╝╚══════╝╚═╝ ╚═╝ ╚══╝╚══╝
By WithSecure Countercept (@FranticTyping, @AlexKornitzer)
[+] Loading detection rules from: ../../rules/, /tmp/sigma/rules
[+] Loaded 129 detection rules (198 not loaded)
[+] Loading event logs from: ../../evtx_attack_samples (extensions: .evtx)
[+] Loaded 268 EVTX files (37.5 MB)
[+] Hunting: [========================================] 268/268
[+] Group: Antivirus
┌─────────────────────┬────────────────────┬──────────┬───────────┬─────────────┬────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────┐
│ timestamp │ detections │ Event ID │ Record ID │ Computer │ Threat Name │ Threat Path │ User │
├─────────────────────┼────────────────────┼──────────┼───────────┼─────────────┼────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ 2019-07-18 20:40:00 │ ‣ Windows Defender │ 1116 │ 37 │ MSEDGEWIN10 │ Trojan:PowerShell/Powersploit. │ file:_C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomic- │ MSEDGEWIN10\IEUser │
│ │ │ │ │ │ M │ red-team-master\atomics\T1056\ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ Get-Keystrokes.ps1 │ │
├─────────────────────┼────────────────────┼──────────┼───────────┼─────────────┼────────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┤
│ 2019-07-18 20:53:31 │ ‣ Windows Defender │ 1117 │ 106 │ MSEDGEWIN10 │ Trojan:XML/Exeselrun.gen!A │ file:_C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomic- │ MSEDGEWIN10\IEUser │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ red-team-master\atomics\T1086\ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ payloads\test.xsl │ │
└─────────────────────┴────────────────────┴──────────┴───────────┴─────────────┴────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────┘
[+] Group: Log Tampering
┌─────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┬──────────┬───────────┬────────────────────────────────┬───────────────┐
│ timestamp │ detections │ Event ID │ Record ID │ Computer │ User │
├─────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┼──────────┼───────────┼────────────────────────────────┼───────────────┤
│ 2019-01-20 07:00:50 │ ‣ Security Audit Logs Cleared │ 1102 │ 32853 │ WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp │ Administrator │
└─────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────┴──────────┴───────────┴────────────────────────────────┴───────────────┘
[+] Group: Sigma
┌─────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────┬───────┬────────────────────────────────┬──────────┬───────────┬──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┐
│ timestamp │ detections │ count │ Event.System.Provider │ Event ID │ Record ID │ Computer │ Event Data │
├─────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────┼───────┼────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼───────────┼──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2019-04-29 20:59:14 │ ‣ Malicious Named Pipe │ 1 │ Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon │ 18 │ 8046 │ IEWIN7 │ --- │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Image: System │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ PipeName: "\\46a676ab7f179e511 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ e30dd2dc41bd388" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ProcessGuid: 365ABB72-D9C4-5CC │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 7-0000-0010EA030000 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ProcessId: 4 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ RuleName: "" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ UtcTime: "2019-04-29 20:59:14. │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 430" │
├─────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────┼───────┼────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼───────────┼──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2019-04-30 20:26:51 │ ‣ CobaltStrike Service │ 1 │ Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon │ 13 │ 9806 │ IEWIN7 │ --- │
│ │ Installations in Registry │ │ │ │ │ │ Details: "%%COMSPEC%% /b /c st │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ art /b /min powershell.exe -no │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ p -w hidden -noni -c \"if([Int │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Ptr]::Size -eq 4){$b='powershe │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ll.exe'}else{$b=$env:windir+'\ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ \syswow64\\WindowsPowerShell\\ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ v1.0\\powershell.exe'};$s=New- │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Object System.Diagnostics.Proc │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ essStartInfo;$s.FileName=$b;$s │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ .Arguments='-noni -nop -w hidd │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ en -c &([scriptblock]::create( │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ (New-Object IO.StreamReader(Ne │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ w-Object IO.Compression.GzipSt │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ream((New-Object IO.MemoryStre │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ am(,[Convert]::FromBase64Strin │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ g(''H4sIAIuvyFwCA7VW+2/aSBD+OZ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ H6P1... │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ (use --full to show all content) │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ EventType: SetValue │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Image: "C:\\Windows\\system32\ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ \services.exe" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ProcessGuid: 365ABB72-2586-5CC │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 9-0000-0010DC530000 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ProcessId: 460 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ RuleName: "" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ TargetObject: "HKLM\\System\\C │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ urrentControlSet\\services\\he │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ llo\\ImagePath" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ UtcTime: "2019-04-30 20:26:51. │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 934" │
├─────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────┼───────┼────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼───────────┼──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2019-05-12 12:52:43 │ ‣ Meterpreter or Cobalt │ 1 │ Service Control Manager │ 7045 │ 10446 │ IEWIN7 │ --- │
│ │ Strike Getsystem Service │ │ │ │ │ │ AccountName: LocalSystem │
│ │ Installation │ │ │ │ │ │ ImagePath: "%COMSPEC% /c ping │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ -n 1 127.0.0.1 >nul && echo 'W │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ inPwnage' > \\\\.\\pipe\\WinPw │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ nagePipe" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ServiceName: WinPwnage │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ServiceType: user mode service │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ StartType: demand start │
├─────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────┼───────┼────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼───────────┼──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2019-06-21 07:35:37 │ ‣ Dumpert Process Dumper │ 1 │ Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon │ 11 │ 238375 │ alice.insecurebank.local │ --- │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ CreationUtcTime: "2019-06-21 0 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 6:53:03.227" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Image: "C:\\Users\\administrat │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ or\\Desktop\\x64\\Outflank-Dum │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ pert.exe" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ProcessGuid: ECAD0485-88C9-5D0 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ C-0000-0010348C1D00 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ProcessId: 3572 │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ RuleName: "" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ TargetFilename: "C:\\Windows\\ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Temp\\dumpert.dmp" │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ UtcTime: "2019-06-21 07:35:37. │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 324" │
└─────────────────────┴────────────────────────────────┴───────┴────────────────────────────────┴──────────┴───────────┴──────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────┘Shimcache
From the collected raw files. there is the SYSTEM hive.
./chainsaw analyse shimcache ./SYSTEM --regexfile ./analysis/shimcache_patterns.txt --amcache ./Amcache.hve --tspair --output ./output.csvSRUM
Analyse the SRUM database (the SOFTWARE hive is mandatory)
./chainsaw analyse srum --software ./SOFTWARE ./SRUDB.dat --output ./output.json$ ./chainsaw analyse srum --software ./SOFTWARE ./SRUDB.dat -o ./output.json
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╚═════╝╚═╝ ╚═╝╚═╝ ╚═╝╚═╝╚═╝ ╚═══╝╚══════╝╚═╝ ╚═╝ ╚══╝╚══╝
By WithSecure Countercept (@FranticTyping, @AlexKornitzer)
[+] ESE database file loaded from "/home/user/Documents/SRUDB.dat"
[+] Parsing the ESE database...
[+] SOFTWARE hive loaded from "/home/user/Documents/SOFTWARE"
[+] Parsing the SOFTWARE registry hive...
[+] Analysing the SRUM database...
[+] Details about the tables related to the SRUM extensions:
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| Table GUID | Table Name | DLL Path | Timeframe of the data | Expected Retention Time |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {5C8CF1C7-7257-4F13-B223-970EF5939312} | App Timeline Provider | %SystemRoot%\System32\eeprov.dll | 2022-03-10 16:34:59 UTC | 7 days |
| | | | 2022-03-10 21:10:00 UTC | |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {B6D82AF1-F780-4E17-8077-6CB9AD8A6FC4} | Tagged Energy Provider | %SystemRoot%\System32\eeprov.dll | No records | 3 days |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {D10CA2FE-6FCF-4F6D-848E-B2E99266FA86} | WPN SRUM Provider | %SystemRoot%\System32\wpnsruprov.dll | 2022-03-10 20:09:00 UTC | 60 days |
| | | | 2022-03-10 21:09:00 UTC | |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {D10CA2FE-6FCF-4F6D-848E-B2E99266FA89} | Application Resource Usage Provider | %SystemRoot%\System32\appsruprov.dll | 2022-03-10 16:34:59 UTC | 60 days |
| | | | 2022-03-10 21:10:00 UTC | |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {FEE4E14F-02A9-4550-B5CE-5FA2DA202E37} | Energy Usage Provider | %SystemRoot%\System32\energyprov.dll | No records | 60 days |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {FEE4E14F-02A9-4550-B5CE-5FA2DA202E37}LT | Energy Usage Provider (Long Term) | %SystemRoot%\System32\energyprov.dll | No records | 1820 days |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {973F5D5C-1D90-4944-BE8E-24B94231A174} | Windows Network Data Usage Monitor | %SystemRoot%\System32\nduprov.dll | 2022-03-10 16:34:59 UTC | 60 days |
| | | | 2022-03-10 21:10:00 UTC | |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {7ACBBAA3-D029-4BE4-9A7A-0885927F1D8F} | vfuprov | %SystemRoot%\System32\vfuprov.dll | 2022-03-10 20:09:00 UTC | 60 days |
| | | | 2022-03-10 21:10:00 UTC | |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {DA73FB89-2BEA-4DDC-86B8-6E048C6DA477} | Energy Estimation Provider | %SystemRoot%\System32\eeprov.dll | No records | 7 days |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| {DD6636C4-8929-4683-974E-22C046A43763} | Windows Network Connectivity Usage Monitor | %SystemRoot%\System32\ncuprov.dll | 2022-03-10 16:34:59 UTC | 60 days |
| | | | 2022-03-10 21:10:00 UTC | |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
[+] SRUM database parsed successfully
[+] Saving output to "/home/user/Documents/output.json"
[+] Saved output to "/home/user/Documents/output.json"zircolite
python3 zircolite.py --evtx Logs/ --package
Hayabusa
Import the logs into Timeline Explorer and add visualization filter by: LEVEL > COMPUTER > RULE
DeepBlueCLI & WELA & APT-Hunter
These tools are also useful to collect pieces of evidence from eventx. For example, WELA can detail authentication on the machine by user and their types.
Manual Analysis with ericzimmerman Tools
Each facet of analysis is delineated into subsections accessible through the navigation menu on this page.
The files under analysis are:
Timeline Explorer, EZViewer, and Hasher are proficient tools for concurrently examining all artifacts.
Timeline Explorer
Opening all the CSV files post-normalization tailored by the specific tools.
EZViewer
Opening single files (docx, csv, pdf, etc).
Hasher
Hash everything.
Dissect
Dissect is an incident response framework build from various parsers and implementations of file formats. Tying this all together, Dissect allows you to work with tools named target-query and target-shell to quickly gain access to forensic artefacts, such as Runkeys, Prefetch files, and Windows Event Logs, just to name a few!
And the best thing: all in a singular way, regardless of underlying container (E01, VMDK, QCoW), filesystem (NTFS, ExtFS, FFS), or Operating System (Windows, Linux, ESXi) structure / combination. You no longer have to bother extracting files from your forensic container, mount them (in case of VMDKs and such), retrieve the MFT, and parse it using a separate tool, to finally create a timeline to analyse. This is all handled under the hood by Dissect in a user-friendly manner.
If we take the example above, you can start analysing parsed MFT entries by just using a command like target-query -f mft <PATH_TO_YOUR_IMAGE>!
target-shell <PATH_TO_YOUR_IMAGE>
<PATH_TO_YOUR_IMAGE>
Download artifacts from image raw (VMDK, E01, RAW, etc)
target-dump -o . --restart -f mft,usnjrnl,amcache.applaunches,amcache.application_files,amcache.applications,amcache.device_containers,amcache.drivers,amcache.files,amcache.programs,amcache.shortcuts,defender.evtx,defender.exclusions,defender.quarantine,shimcache,lnk,services,runkeys,shellbags,browser.history,browser.downloads,tasks,remoteaccess,shell,ssh,windows.users,jumplist,prefetch,recyclebin,recentfilecache,sru,startupinfo,syscache,thumbcache,wer,wua_history <TARGET_PATH.RAW>After that, convert all the jsonl files from the dissect output into CSV files to import them in the Timeline Explorer!
import os
import csv
import json
import sys
# Function to convert JSONL to CSV, skipping the first line
def convert_jsonl_to_csv(jsonl_file, csv_file):
with open(jsonl_file, 'r') as json_file:
with open(csv_file, 'w', newline='') as csv_out:
csv_writer = csv.writer(csv_out)
# Skip the first line
next(json_file)
for line in json_file:
data = json.loads(line)
if csv_out.tell() == 0: # Write the header in the first line
csv_writer.writerow(data.keys())
csv_writer.writerow(data.values())
# Ask the user for the base directory
base_dir = input('Please enter the base directory path: ')
# Check if the directory exists
if not os.path.isdir(base_dir):
print(f"The path {base_dir} does not exist. Please try again.")
else:
# Count total number of files to process
total_files = sum(len(files) for _, _, files in os.walk(base_dir) if any(file.endswith('.jsonl') for file in files))
progress = 0
finished_files = [] # List to keep track of finished files
# Walk through the directories and subdirectories recursively
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(base_dir):
for file in files:
if file.endswith('.jsonl'):
jsonl_path = os.path.join(root, file)
csv_path = os.path.join(root, file.replace('.jsonl', '.csv'))
convert_jsonl_to_csv(jsonl_path, csv_path)
progress += 1
finished_files.append(file)
# Show files converted so far
print("\nFiles converted so far:")
for finished in finished_files:
print(finished)
# Print progress bar with file name
bar_length = 40 # Length of the progress bar
progress_bar = '#' * int(bar_length * progress / total_files)
sys.stdout.write(f'\rConverting {file}: [{progress_bar:<{bar_length}}] {progress}/{total_files} files converted')
sys.stdout.flush()
print("\nAll files converted!")
Drop all the security logs from Collectors zip files
import zipfile
import os
import shutil
# Lista das pastas
folders = [
"cxxxx000031/",
"Cxxxx00010CV/"
]
# Diretório de saída
output_dir = "output_evtx"
os.makedirs(output_dir, exist_ok=True)
# Loop por cada pasta para processar o ficheiro ZIP
for folder in folders:
# Localizar qualquer arquivo ZIP que comece com "Collection-"
for filename in os.listdir(folder):
if filename.startswith("Collection-") and filename.endswith(".zip"):
zip_path = os.path.join(folder, filename)
prefix = os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(folder)) # Prefixo com o nome da pasta
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, 'r') as zip_ref:
# Procurar o ficheiro Security.evtx dentro do ZIP
for file in zip_ref.namelist():
if "Security.evtx" in file:
# Extrair e renomear o ficheiro com o prefixo da pasta
output_file_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{prefix}_Security.evtx")
with zip_ref.open(file) as source, open(output_file_path, "wb") as target:
shutil.copyfileobj(source, target)
print(f"Extraído: {output_file_path}")
break # Parar após encontrar o Security.evtx
break # Prosseguir para a próxima pasta após encontrar um ZIP que comece com "Collection-"
Yara scan in raw formats
target-query -f yara xxxx-flat.vmdk -p '/c:' --check -r yara/
target-yara xxx-flat.vmdk -p 'c:\Users' --check -r yara/ | tee -a output.log
target-yara xxx-flat.vmdk -p 'c:\Windows\Temp' --check -r yara/ | tee -a out
target-yara xxx-flat.vmdk -p 'c:\Users\ProgramData' --check -r yara/ | tee -a outMy bundle:
Convert from yara output into CSV
import csv
import re
def parse_yara_output(line):
pattern = r"hostname='(?P<hostname>.*?)' domain='(?P<domain>.*?)' path='(?P<path>.*?)' digest=\(md5=(?P<md5>.*?), sha1=(?P<sha1>.*?), sha256=(?P<sha256>.*?)\) rule='(?P<rule>.*?)' tags=\[(?P<tags>.*?)\] namespace='(?P<namespace>.*?)'"
match = re.search(pattern, line)
if match:
return match.groupdict()
return None
def main():
input_filename = input("Digite o nome do ficheiro de output YARA: ")
output_filename = input_filename.split('.')[0] + ".csv"
with open(input_filename, 'r') as infile:
yara_data = infile.readlines()
parsed_data = [parse_yara_output(line) for line in yara_data if parse_yara_output(line)]
fields = ["hostname", "domain", "path", "md5", "sha1", "sha256", "rule", "tags", "namespace"]
with open(output_filename, 'w', newline='') as csvfile:
csvwriter = csv.DictWriter(csvfile, fieldnames=fields)
csvwriter.writeheader()
for data in parsed_data:
# Converte a lista de tags para string, se existir
if data['tags']:
data['tags'] = ", ".join(data['tags'].split(", "))
csvwriter.writerow(data)
print(f"Ficheiro CSV gerado: {output_filename}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()After that you can import the CSV in Timeline Explorer and group the output by matched rules ;)
Yara Repositories:
Loki Yara
Awesome Yara
Dissect Documentation:
Dissect Tutorials
gKAPE (offline parser)
Using the gkape tool to parse the telemetry obtained from the collector (raw log files from Windows).
After getting all the zip outputs from the target machines, the following procedure should be executed:
The files should be prepared to analyze
The following python script executed on the root folder:
import os
import shutil
def list_folders(directory):
try:
# Construct the full path
full_path = os.path.abspath(directory)
# Check if the directory exists
if not os.path.exists(full_path):
raise FileNotFoundError(f"Directory '{directory}' does not exist.")
# List all entries in the directory
entries = os.listdir(full_path)
# Filter only directories
folders = [entry for entry in entries if os.path.isdir(os.path.join(full_path, entry))]
return folders
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error: {e}")
return []
def copy_thumbcache_files(root_folder, output_folder):
try:
# Create output folder if it doesn't exist
if not os.path.exists(output_folder):
os.makedirs(output_folder)
# List all folders in the root folder
folders = list_folders(root_folder)
# Iterate through each folder
for folder in folders:
folder_path = os.path.join(root_folder, folder)
explorer_path = os.path.join(folder_path, 'AppData', 'Local', 'Microsoft', 'Windows', 'Explorer')
# Check if the Explorer folder exists
if os.path.exists(explorer_path):
# Iterate through files in Explorer folder
files = os.listdir(explorer_path)
# Copy thumbcache files to output folder
for file in files:
if file.startswith("thumbcache"):
file_path = os.path.join(explorer_path, file)
shutil.copy(file_path, os.path.join(output_folder, file))
print(f"Copied '{file}' to '{output_folder}'")
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error: {e}")
# Root folder to search for user folders
root_folder = 'uploads\\auto\\C%3A\\Users'
# Output folder for copied thumbcache files
output_folder = 'output_thumbcache'
# Copy thumbcache files to output folder
copy_thumbcache_files(root_folder, output_folder)
Changing the following mkape files:
Description: 'thumbcache_viewer_cmd.exe: process Windows Thumbcache files'
Category: FileKnowledge
Author: Dennis Reneau, Kevin Pagano
Version: 2.0
Id: 8896483c-563a-4a28-ad8a-07ba74a54a63
BinaryUrl: https://github.com/thumbcacheviewer/thumbcacheviewer/releases/download/v1.0.1.8/thumbcache_viewer_cmd.zip
ExportFormat: html
Processors:
-
Executable: thumbcache_viewer_cmd.exe
CommandLine: -o %destinationDirectory%\ThumbCache_Results -w -c -z -d %sourceDirectory%\output_thumbcache
ExportFormat: html
ExportFile: thumbcache_results.csv
# Documentation
# Uses Thumbcache Viewer (https://github.com/thumbcacheviewer)
# Designed to work with the Thumbcache DB Target collection created by Eric Zimmerman.
# Executable author Eric Kutcher.
# Point msource (Module Source) to the Thumbcache folder or use the Target/Module option of KAPE.
# Options -w HTML Report | -c CSV Report | -z Exclude 0 byte files | -n Prevent Thumbnail extraction | -o Output
# 2023-06-27 Updated by Kevin Pagano: Updated binary URL, changed source to directory for parsing to HMTL properly if more than DB one fileUse the following modules:
!!Tools-Sync
!EZParser
Bits-Parser
BMC-Tools
ThumbCacheViewer
DHParser
LogParser (Run all)
--or--
LogParser_RDPUsageEvents
LogParser_xxxAlso, run the following manually:
-----CHAINSAW----
Chainsaw.exe search -i mimikatz z:\Collection-contabilxxxx\uploads\auto\C%3A\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\
C:\Users\malwr\Desktop\kape-gui\KAPE\Modules\Chainsaw>Chainsaw.exe hunt z:\Collection-contabilixxxxxx\uploads\auto\C%3A\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ -s sigma/ --mapping mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.yml -r rules/ --level critical
C:\Users\malwr\Desktop\kape-gui\KAPE\Modules\Chainsaw>Chainsaw.exe hunt z:\Collection-contabilxxxxx\uploads\auto\C%3A\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ -s sigma/ --mapping mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.yml -r rules/ -o teste
---DEEP BLUE CLI-------
DeepblueCLI
---- LOG PARSER----
LogParser.exe: -stats:OFF -i:EVT "SELECT TO_UTCTIME(TimeGenerated) AS Date, EventID, 'Client attempted to access SMB via an anonymous logon.' AS Description, EXTRACT_TOKEN(Strings,8,'|') AS UserName, EXTRACT_TOKEN(Strings,10,'|') AS ClientName INTO 'Z:\Contabilidade\Scan2\RemoteAccess\logparser-SMBServer-Anonymous-Logon.csv' FROM '"Z:\Collection-xxxxx\uploads\auto\C%3A\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-SMBServer%254Security.evtx"' WHERE EventID=551" -filemode:0Have a good hunting! 😎
GRR
GRR is a python client (agent) that is installed on target systems, and python server infrastructure that can manage and talk to clients.
References
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